Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008400100001-7

TOP SECRET

25X1

Copy No. C 1/0

25X1



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

25X1		
/ · ·		

STATE review specova pleter Release 2003/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00975A008400100001-7

13 July 1965

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

25X1

- 2. Dominican Republic: Formation of provisional government delayed by reluctance of Dominicans to accept political responsibility. (Page 3)
- 3. Common Market: French officials stress only way to solve crisis is through bilateral talks. (Page 4)

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

*Dominican Republic: Formation of a provisional government is being delayed by the reluctance of Dominicans to accept political responsibility.

Eduardo Read Barreras has declined the post of vice president in a provisional government. Read, currently ambassador to Rome, expressed his decision in cables to both loyalist and rebel factions. His withdrawal from consideration is indicative of the response Garcia Godoy is meeting in efforts to find capable Dominicans with enough political courage to form a provisional government.

The rebels staged a rally in Santo Domingo yesterday to celebrate the 41st anniversary of the departure of US occupation troops. Several thousand people heard rebel president Francisco Caamano appeal for unity and describe his government's proposals for an end to the present crisis.

Meanwhile, labor trouble, some of it politically

	inspired, continues to plague the sugar industry.		
	Labor organizers at La Romana,	25X	
25X1	are attempting to incite idle sugar workers		
	to attack police and army installations. The US-owned		
	sugar complex at La Romana has been closed since		
	4 July, when the arrest of three extremist union		
	leaders for illegal possession of arms sparked a walkout.		
	Walkout.		
	Officials at the government-owned Haina Sugar		
	Corporation are worried that non-payment of wages		
	will provoke workers into sabotaging the sugar mills.		
	The corporation has requested OAS financial assist-		
	ance but corporation officials fear that the requested funds will not arrive in time to avert violence.	25X1	

13 July 65

Common Market: French officials continue to stress that the only way to solve the Common Market crisis is through bilateral talks outside the community institutions.

Despite public statements by the Belgian and Dutch foreign ministers that their current talks in Paris are only exploratory and that any new proposals should come from the EEC Commission, their visits may serve the French purpose. 7

The visits also seem at cross-purposes with the West German - Italian line on upholding the community approach at least for the time being. Both countries are strongly advocating that the 26 July Council of Ministers meeting be held.

Paris has given some indications of a ''softer'' line, hinting that it might under certain conditions attend the council meeting and disclaiming an intention to block the EEC's passage to majority voting in January 1966. Such talk may represent Paris' desire to reassure French economic interests rather than an intention to abandon the fight against the community's institutions. Couve has told Ambassador Bohlen that he did not know whether France would attend a council meeting. In any case, it would do so only on a pro-forma basis and if "political" subjects were avoided.

The US Embassy in London warns that, if the crisis is prolonged, Wilson may try to exploit it despite urging by groups in both major parties and in the press that he keep out of the debate for now and play a "constructive role" later in any new effort toward a truly integrated Europe. The embassy believes that Wilson is likely to "seek the greatest advantage while paying the smallest price in terms of institutional and political commitment."

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008400 00001-7

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The United States Intelligence Board on 9 July 1965 approved the following national intelligence estimate:

NIE 88-65, "Prospects for Colombia" 25X1

13 July 65

25X1

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 7003/05/19 E-074PRDP79T00975A008400100001-7